...
"There can be no doubt that
Saddam Hussein has biological weapons
and the capability to rapidly produce
more, many more."
Colin L. Powell
United Nations
Feb. 5, 2003
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 2004 — A year ago this weekend, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell holed up in a conference room next to George J. Tenet's office at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, applying a critical eye to the satellite photos, communications intercepts and reports that would form the basis for the Bush administration's most comprehensive — and carefully worded — public case about the urgent threat Iraq posed to the world.
After several lengthy sessions, he appeared in New York on Feb. 5, with Mr. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, seated behind him, to tell the United Nations Security Council that the evidence added up to "facts" and "not assertions" that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and that it was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and building a fleet of advanced missiles.
(...)
Doubts had surrounded much of the evidence ever since American inspectors arrived in Iraq. Yet in the days since Dr. Kay definitively declared that Iraq had no significant stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons when the invasion began in March, Washington has been seized by the question of how and why such an intelligence gap happened.
Even some Republican lawmakers are talking about a failure of egregious proportions — akin, some think, to the failure to grasp the forces pulling apart the Soviet Union in the late 1980's.
Interviews (...) suggest that Mr. Powell's case was largely based on limited, fragmentary and mostly circumstantial evidence, with conclusions drawn on the basis of the little challenged assumption that Saddam Hussein would never dismantle old illicit weapons and would pursue new ones to the fullest extent possible. (...) satellite photographs of suspected chemical weapons sites, appears to have been misjudged.
Representative Porter J. Goss, the Florida Republican (...) said the intelligence agencies were severely limited in their analysis by inadequate information about Iraq and what it intended.
Nor did they find evidence of anything but the most rudimentary nuclear program: United Nations sanctions had choked off the project, and the few parts saved from efforts to enrich uranium in the 1980's remained buried under a rose garden.
The New York Times
Não sei se é necessário comentar qualquer palavra a respeito disso. Só quero ver que atenção as pessoas vão dar para um fato seríssimo deste e quais vão ser as consequências. To até supresa de ver esta matéria (de oito folhas) no Times de Domingo, quem puder ler, vale muito a pena.
Ah, e tem uma coisa muito importante, um fator ruim deste texto e que a Tv está enfiando na cabeça do povo, a culpa é de fulano, ciclano, Powell, a puta que pariu, menos de Bush, que foi à Tv dizer que quer saber quem é o responsável por tantos erros...
"There can be no doubt that
Saddam Hussein has biological weapons
and the capability to rapidly produce
more, many more."
Colin L. Powell
United Nations
Feb. 5, 2003
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 2004 — A year ago this weekend, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell holed up in a conference room next to George J. Tenet's office at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, applying a critical eye to the satellite photos, communications intercepts and reports that would form the basis for the Bush administration's most comprehensive — and carefully worded — public case about the urgent threat Iraq posed to the world.
After several lengthy sessions, he appeared in New York on Feb. 5, with Mr. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, seated behind him, to tell the United Nations Security Council that the evidence added up to "facts" and "not assertions" that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and that it was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and building a fleet of advanced missiles.
(...)
Doubts had surrounded much of the evidence ever since American inspectors arrived in Iraq. Yet in the days since Dr. Kay definitively declared that Iraq had no significant stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons when the invasion began in March, Washington has been seized by the question of how and why such an intelligence gap happened.
Even some Republican lawmakers are talking about a failure of egregious proportions — akin, some think, to the failure to grasp the forces pulling apart the Soviet Union in the late 1980's.
Interviews (...) suggest that Mr. Powell's case was largely based on limited, fragmentary and mostly circumstantial evidence, with conclusions drawn on the basis of the little challenged assumption that Saddam Hussein would never dismantle old illicit weapons and would pursue new ones to the fullest extent possible. (...) satellite photographs of suspected chemical weapons sites, appears to have been misjudged.
Representative Porter J. Goss, the Florida Republican (...) said the intelligence agencies were severely limited in their analysis by inadequate information about Iraq and what it intended.
Nor did they find evidence of anything but the most rudimentary nuclear program: United Nations sanctions had choked off the project, and the few parts saved from efforts to enrich uranium in the 1980's remained buried under a rose garden.
The New York Times
Não sei se é necessário comentar qualquer palavra a respeito disso. Só quero ver que atenção as pessoas vão dar para um fato seríssimo deste e quais vão ser as consequências. To até supresa de ver esta matéria (de oito folhas) no Times de Domingo, quem puder ler, vale muito a pena.
Ah, e tem uma coisa muito importante, um fator ruim deste texto e que a Tv está enfiando na cabeça do povo, a culpa é de fulano, ciclano, Powell, a puta que pariu, menos de Bush, que foi à Tv dizer que quer saber quem é o responsável por tantos erros...
